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NOTES
LESSOR'S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN A HABITABLE
DWELLING: ENFORCEMENT BY LESSEE AND
RETALIATORY ACTION BY LESSOR
In the 1975 regular session of the Louisiana legislature,
three bills were introduced for the purpose of prohibiting
retaliatory conduct by residential lessors against their les-
sees.1 "Retaliatory conduct" under the proposed legislation
included eviction, reduction in services, or an increase in rent
by the lessor in response to the lessee's reporting of housing
code violations to municipal authorities, complaining of the
condition of the leased premises to the lessor, or joining a
tenants' union.2
As the above legislation failed to achieve passage, this
note will briefly examine the current status of the law in
Louisiana and other jurisdictions with respect to a lessor's
obligation to maintain a habitable dwelling and his lessee's
right to enforce that obligation. Existing means of preventing
retaliation by the lessor for the lessee's attempts to enforce
his right to a habitable dwelling will be considered.
At common law a lease traditionally was considered an
estate in land, and the tenant took the leased premises with
existing infirmities. 3 The tenant was bound to inspect the
thing before leasing it and was subject to the doctrine of
caveat emptor, since the common law traditionally implied no
warranty by the lessor that the leased premises were habit-
able or suitable for the tenant's purposes. 4 However, in recent
1. La. H.B. 709, 1st Reg. Sess. (1975): 1975 LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR OF
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, 1st Reg. Sess. 200; La. H.B. 790, 1st Reg. Sess.
(1975): 1975 LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, 1st Reg.
Sess. 220; La. S.B. 251, 1st Reg. Sess. (1975): 1975 LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR OF
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, 1st Reg. Sess. 548.
2. The problem of retaliatory conduct has been cited as particularly
acute in low-income areas where there is a shortage of habitable housing. See
F. GRAD, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS at 124 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as GRAD]; Lipsky & Neumann, Landlord-Tenant Law in the
United States and West Germany-A Comparison of Legal Approaches, 44 TUL.
L. REV. 36 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Lipsky & Neumann]; Note, 6 RUTGERS
CAMDEN L.J. 565 (1975). Residential tenants, because of limited housing mar-
kets, are in an unequal bargaining position when dealing with landlords.
3. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 178 & 300 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter cited as POWELL].
4. R. MINOR & J. WURTS, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 305 (1910); Pow-
ELL at 300.
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years some common law courts have abandoned the rule of no
warranty of habitability.5
The adoption of municipal housing codes has been in-
strumental in this change. Although the housing codes nor-
mally provide only for governmental enforcement of stan-
dards of habitability and safety, the Court of Appeals, District
of Columbia, held in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.6
that the housing codes enacted for Washington, D.C., estab-
lished a standard for a lessor's warranty of habitability by
operation of law. By adopting this statutory standard of
habitability the court barred the landlord's enforcement of
the tenant's obligation to pay rent when the premises were in
violation of the housing codes. 7 Following its lead, other
jurisdictions have established warranties of habitability both
jurisprudentially" and statutorily, 9 often utilizing existing
housing codes as standards of habitability.
In Louisiana, a lease is a synallagmatic contract. 10 Civil
Code article 2692 requires the lessor to maintain the premises
"in a condition such as to serve for the use" intended by
contracting parties.1 1 Furthermore, Civil Code article 269512
5. E.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969); Reste Realty Corp.
v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1968); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590,
111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
6. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
7. See also Brown v. Southall Realty Corp., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968)
(lease held void when entered into in violation of existing housing codes).
8. E.g., Bayview Estates, Inc. v. Bayview Mobile Homeowners Ass'n, 508
F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1974); LeClair v. Woodward, 316 A.2d 79i (Conn. Cir. 1970);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 11. 2d 531, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); City of Dover v.
B.C.P. Realty Corp., 112 N.H. 238, 293 A.2d 599 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56
N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). Contra, Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 536 P.2d 838
(Colo. App. 1975).
9. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-24 (1958) and 47-24b (1958); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 26.1109 (1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN, § 48-A:Sub. 3 (1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. 2A:42-85 (1952).
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2669.
11. Id. art. 2692: "The lessor is bound from the very nature of the con-
tract, and without any clause to that effect: (1) To deliver the thing leased to
the lessee. (2) To maintain the thing in a condition such as to serve for the
use for which it is hired. (3) To cause the lessee to be in a peaceable posses-
sion of the thing during the continuance of the lease."
12. Id. art. 2695: "The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices
and defects of the thing, which may prevent its being used even in case it
should appear he knew nothing of the existence of such vices and defects, at
the time the lease was made, and even if they have arisen since, provided
they do not arise from the fault of the lessee; and if any loss should result to
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provides for a warranty by operation of law that the leased
premises are fit for the purposes intended; 13 the article 2695
warranty is comparable logically to the implied warranty of
habitability that has developed in other jurisdictions. 14 Thus
the law of lease in Louisiana, unlike the common law, has
provided the lessee a statutory warranty of fitness for many
years. Although Louisiana courts have not applied housing
codes as a standard of habitability for the enforcement of
Civil Code articles 2692 and 2695, these codes provide an
available standard should courts decide to apply them. 15 Such
an application would be consistent with the purposes of the
establishment of housing codes as well as with articles 2692
and 2695;16 thus, where codes exist courts should consider
them in applying a standard of fitness under these articles.
In Louisiana and elsewhere several methods exist
through which the tenant can seek to insure that the leased
premises are maintained properly. He can report violations of
housing code provisions to the proper authorities, or he can
demand informally that the landlord remedy an unsatisfac-
tory condition in the leased premises. Another alternative is
for tenants to organize in order to effect greater influence or
pressure on landlords to insure that they correct deficiencies
in the leased premises. 17 In Louisiana, the lessee can sue for
dissolution of the lease agreement and resultant damages,' 8
and Civil Code article 2695 offers a basis for indemnification
the lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to indemnify
him for the same."
13. Brunies v. Police Jury of Jefferson Parish, 237 La. 227, 110 So. 2d 732
(1959); Lazare, Levy & Co. v. Madden, 116 La. 374, 40 So. 766 (1906);
Denman v. Lopez, 12 La. Ann. 823 (1857); Caffin v. Redon, 6 La. Ann. 487
(1851); Equilease Corp. v. Hill, 290 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Note, 23
LA. L. REV. 458 (1963).
14. See Purnell v. Dugue, 129 So. 178 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930) (lack of heat
in a modern apartment was found to be in violation of the warranty of fitness
for purposes intended).
15. See Evans v. Does, 283 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
16. See Kenner, La., Code Ch. 5, §§ 5-57 and 5-78 (1972); New Orleans, La.,
Code Ch. 30, § 30-13 (1956), for language expressing a public policy interest in
maintaining safe, habitable housing.
17. See Davis & Schwartz, Tenant Unions: An Experiment in Private
Law-Making, 2 HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 237 (1967).
18. Later cases have shown a reticence to dissolve a lease on the basis of
violation of warranty. Billeaudeaux v. Soileau, 303 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1974); Bialy v. Katz, 273 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 275 So.
2d 870 (La. 1973).
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for injuries incurred by the lessee as the result of violation of
the warranty of fitness. Planiol suggests that a reduction in
rent is an appropriate remedy under this article.19
A more effective device tenants use to force landlords to
maintain habitable leased premises is the withholding of rent
until needed repairs are made. At traditional common law no
such remedy was available because a tenant's obligation to
pay rent was independent of any covenant to repair on the
part of the landlord. 20 As a result, a landlord could obtain
remedy for non-payment of rent even though the tenant
withheld the rent only because the landlord was delinquent in
making agreed-upon repairs. A recognition that this tradi-
tional rule of lease law did not adequately protect tenants
under residential leases has led to changes in several juris-
dictions. 21 In some instances a tenant may enforce the land-
lord's obligation to make repairs by paying rent into the re-
gistry of the court and preventing the landlord from receiving
it until he makes required repairs.22
The Louisiana lessee has never suffered from the infirm
doctrine of independent covenants since a lease in Louisiana
is treated as a contract with dependent obligations. 23 Louisi-
ana Civil Code article 2694 permits the lessee to deduct the
cost of repairs from the rent owed the lessor and to effect
needed repairs himself.24 However, such a deduction for re-
19. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 2, no. 1689 at 24 (11th ed. La. St.
L. Inst. transl. 1959). Allowing a lessee to remain in possession of leased
premises at a reduced rent is more advantageous for the lessee than dissolu-
tion and damages when there is a limited housing market or the tenant is
of limited financial means.
20. See GRAD at 119; Lipsky & Neumann at 39.
21. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
22. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83:60 (1973); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACT AND PROC.
LAWS § 755 (1963); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAWS § 302-a (1974); PURDONS PENN.
STAT. ANN. Tit. 35, § 1700-01 (1966). See also Robinson v. Diamond Housing
Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (court recognized rent withholding as a
valid private enforcement mechanism for housing codes in the same manner
that private reporting of code violations is considered necessary to enforce
housing code provisions).
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2669.
24. Id. art. 2694: "If the lessor do not make the necessary repairs in the
manner required in the preceding article, the lessee may call on him to make
them. If he refuse or neglect to make them, the lessee may himself cause
them to be made, and deduct the price from the rent due, on proving the
repairs were indispensable, and that the price which he has paid was just and
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pairs can serve only to achieve minor repairs, as the value of
repairs the tenant may make is limited to the amount of rent
due the lessor. Furthermore, Louisiana courts have held con-
sistently that article 2694 does not give a lessee the right to
remain in possession of leased premises rent-free until the
lessor complies with his statutory duty to repair. 25 Only after
the lessor is put on notice and fails to repair may the lessee
withhold rent and then only if he repairs the premises. 26
The aforementioned devices of assuring the landlord's
performance of agreed-upon or statutorily required repairs
are of little value if the landlord can retaliate against the
tenant's use of these devices. 2 7 Although the proposed Louisi-
ana legislation would have prohibited retaliation in the form
of increased rent or decreased services in all cases, as the law
stands now, the lessee is protected from increased rent or
decreased services only when he has a lease agreement with a
set term.28 If the lease has no specific term, the lessor can
force the lessee to pay increased rent or accept reduced ser-
vices by threatening to use the lessor's right to evict upon
giving the required statutory notice.29
The form of retaliatory conduct that has received the
most attention is retaliatory eviction. In the leading case
involving the prohibition of retaliatory eviction, Edwards v.
Habib,30 the United States Court of Appeals, District of Co-
lumbia, held that a landlord can evict for any reason or no
reason at all so long as the eviction is not in retaliation for a
tenant's reporting housing code violations. The case espoused
two theories upon which to base its prohibition of retaliatory
eviction. First, in dicta, the court propounded that the gov-
reasonable." See Mullen v. Kerlec, 115 La. 783, 40 So. 46 (1905); Winn v.
Spearing, 26 La. Ann. 384 (1874); Cameron v. Krantz, 299 So. 2d 919 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1974); Degrey v. Fox, 205 So. 2d 849 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Purnell v.
Dugue, 129 So. 178 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930). For similar law in other jurisdic-
tions see Schweiger v. Superior Ct. of Alameda Cty., 90 Cal. R. 729, 476 P.2d 97
(1970); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 380 A.2d 17 (1973); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 42-202 (1961); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 41 § 32 (1951); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 47-16-13 (1960).
25. See cases in note 24, supra.
26. Id.
27. See GRAD at 124; Lipsky & Neumann at 60-64; Note, 6 RUTGERS
CAMDEN L.J. 565 (1975).
28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2684.
29. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4701; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2686.
30. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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ernmental entity's providing the landlord with a means for
evicting a tenant for exercising his first amendment right of
free speech was sufficient to constitute "state action" under
the fourteenth amendment and thus could be prohibited on
constitutional grounds.3 1 This rationale has received some
subsequent application, 3 2 but has not been used as a leading
justification for prohibiting retaliatory eviction.
The court in Edwards based its holding primarily on its
recognition of the need for habitable housing in the Washing-
ton, D.C., area and a legislative intent behind the passage of
the District of Columbia housing codes. 33 Judge Wright ex-
plained:
The notion that the effectiveness of remedial legislation
will be inhibited if those reporting violations of it can
legally be intimidated is so fundamental that a presump-
tion against the legality of such intimidation can be in-
ferred as inherent in the legislation even if it is not ex-
pressed in the statute itself. 34
This rationale has been of greater application than the "state
action" theory both in the case law35 and statutes36 of other
jurisdictions.
Louisiana has no statutory or jurisprudential prohibition
of retaliatory eviction. Article 4701 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure provides for summary proceedings for eviction upon
termination of the lease by expiration of an agreed term,
non-payment of rent, the lessor's action, or any other rea-
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
32. See Thorpe v. Housing Auth. City of Durham, 386 U.S. 670, 674 (1967)
(concurring opinion); Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). Contra, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F.
Supp. 1117 (W.D. Ohio 1974); Aluli v. Trusdell, 508 P.2d 1217 (Hawaii 1973).
33. 397 F.2d at 700 n.40.
34. 397 F.2d at 701-02.
35. Schweiger v. Superior Ct. of Alameda Cty., 90 Cal. R. 729, 476 P.2d 97
(1970); Cornell v. Dimmick, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1973); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis.
2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970). See also Bowles v. Blue Lake Dev. Corp., 504
F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1974); Aweeka v. Bonds, 97 Cal. R. 650 (Cal. App. 1971);
Wilkins v. Tebbetts, 216 So. 2d 477 (3d Dist. Fla. 1968); Bradley v. Gallagher,
14 II1. App. 3d 652, 303 N.E.2d 251 (1973); Newmann v. Hallock, 281 A.2d 544
(N.J. App. 1971).
36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-540 (1958);
ILL. STAT. ANN. Ch. 80, § 71 (1966); ANN. LAWS OF MASS. Ch. 186, § 18 (1969);
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:42-10.10 (1952).
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son.3 7 Also, if the lease has no set term to protect the lessee,
the lessor can give the requisite notice under this article and
cause the lessee's eviction without cause,38 giving a lessor an
opportunity to evict in retaliation for the lessee's exercise of a
right, such as withholding rent for repairs, that he is entitled
to exercise.3 9 In the absence of a statutory prohibition of
retaliatory eviction, the Louisiana courts could apply the rea-
soning of Edwards v. Habib, particularly in light of the war-
ranty of fitness contained in Civil Code article 2695.40
The retaliatory conduct of a lessor toward his lessee can
also be evaluated in light of the traditional civilian concept of
abuse of rights, the exercise of a right by one party in a
manner that causes injury to another.41 Developing originally
in the area of property law, 42 the abuse of rights doctrine has
been expanded in some jurisdictions into other areas, such as
contract and malicious or frivolous use of the judicial sys-
tem. 43 Josserand has defined abuse of rights as the exercise of
37. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4701: "When a lessee's right of occupancy has
ceased because of the termination of the lease by expiration of its term,
action by the lessor, non-payment of rent, or any other reason, and the lessor
wishes to obtain possession of the premises, the lessor or his agent shall
cause written notice to vacate the premises to be delivered to the lessee. The
notice shall allow the lessee not less than five days from the date of the
delivery to vacate leased premises.
"If the lease has no definite term, the notice required by law for its
termination shall be considered as notice to vacate under this article. If the
lease has a definite term, notice to vacate may be given not more than thirty
days before the expiration of the term."
38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2686; see also Lipsky & Neumann at 61. Most
residential leases operate on a month-to-month basis and the tenant is thus
not protected by a lengthy term in the lease.
39. See Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(determination of retaliatory motive is particularly inappropriate for deter-
mination at a summary proceeding). See also Clore v. Fredman, 59 Ill. 2d 20,
319 N.E.2d 18 (1974). In Leggio v. Manion, 172 So. 2d 748 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1965), the court held that withholding rent for repairs under LA. CIV. CODE
art. 2694 can be raised as an affirmative defense in summary eviction pro-
ceedings.
40. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2692, 2695.
41. See Crabb, The French Concept of Abuse of Rights, 6 INTER. AM. L.
REV. 1 (1964); Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35 LA. L. REV. 965 (1975); May-
rand, Abuse of Rights in France and Quebec, 34 LA. L. REV. 993 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Mayrand].
42. E.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 667; see Mayrand at 994.
43. Quebec courts in several instances have required good faith on the
part of a party seeking to terminate a contract even when the right of
termination is allowed expressly in the contract. This good faith requirement
19761
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a right in a manner inconsistent with the social aim or objec-
tive of the right.44 Although Louisiana courts have not yet
utilized the concept of abuse of rights as suggested by Jos-
serand in the area of landlord-tenant relations, such an appli-
cation would provide a sound, logical basis for the prohibition
of retaliatory conduct by a residential lessor.
Even though present Louisiana law does provide pos-
sibilities for the prohibition of retaliatory lessor conduct, Lou-
isiana courts have not yet utilized these options. Legislation
prohibiting such conduct would not only provide protection
for the residential lessee but would also be consistent with
the civilian concept of abuse of rights while providing needed
specificity in the law governing the landlord and tenant rela-
tionship.
John R. Gardner
RECONVENTION FOR DEFAMATION IN THE PLEADINGS:
TOWARD RESPONSIBLE LITIGATION
Defamation has been described as "an invasion of the
interest in reputation and good name."' In Louisiana this
interest receives such high regard that,2 in contrast to the
majority of common law states,3 Louisiana courts extend only
a qualified privilege to statements made by a party or his
has been applied to lease agreements in instances where the lessor has a
stipulation in the lease barring the lessee from subletting or assigning his
lease. Mayrand at 1011.
44. Mayrand at 1000.
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 at 737 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
2. E.g., Kennedy v. Item Co., 213 La. 347, 372, 34 So. 2d 886, 895 (1948)
(interest in reputation is an "inalienable right of every man to be protected
.• 1).
3. In order to be protected under the common law absolute privilege, an
otherwise defamatory statement made in judicial pleadings need only be
relevant to the issue in question to be nonactionable. Thus, if relevant, a
false statement made with malice in judicial pleadings would be protected by
the common law privilege, but not by the Louisiana qualified privilege. See,
e.g., MacLarty v. Whiteford, 30 Colo. App. 378, 496 P.2d 1071 (1972); Finish
Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v. Burruss, 131 Ga. App. 572, 206 S.E.2d 679
(1974); Sanders v. Leeson Air Cond. Corp., 362 Mich. 692, 108 N.W.2d 761
(1961); Bromund v. Holt, 24 Wis. 2d 336,129 N.W.2d 149 (1964); 50 AM. JUR. 2D,
Libel and Slander § 238 (1970).
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